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Third Party Actions Against Co-Employees
John E. Martindale*
B ECAUSE MANY ATTORNEYS view the awards under workmen's
compensation statutes as inadequate, the "third party ac-
tion" is a popular means of escaping the restrictions such statutes
place on common law tort actions. In the past, the practicality of
third party actions has depended heavily on either the unusual
circumstance of a wealthy tort-feasor, or on a finding of vicarious
liability on the part of some person or organization more col-
lectible than the ordinary tort-feasor in industrial accident sit-
uations. However, the widespread prosperity which the United
States has experienced since the Second World War and the in-
creasing private ownership of property in this country have
changed the average workingman's economic status considerably.
To some extent, he no longer enjoys his former "judgment proof"
status. Collectibility has combined with a certain amount of con-
fusion over the exclusiveness of workmen's compensation law
to make actions against co-employee tort-feasors relatively rare.
Since the workman's collectibility has considerably improved, it
is worthwhile to give some consideration to the extent to which
the workmen's compensation statutes allow common law neg-
ligence actions against the injured party's fellow servant.
Industrial injuries involving intentional torts or situations
where the workmen's compensation statute has not been com-
plied with by the employer may, in many cases, relieve the
plaintiff of the restrictions placed on his common law rights.' It
is not our purpose here to explore these exceptions, but to de-
fine the extent to which a right of action exists against the co-
employee tort-feasor who is clearly within the course and scope
of his employment when he inflicts the injury on his fellow
worker.
The workmen's compensation laws in every state permit com-
mon law actions against third parties. 2 The question of who is,
and who is not a third party is by no means as uniformly decided.
As far as the fellow servant is concerned, only seventeen of the
fifty state statutes clearly grant immunity from tort actions.
These acts state that they shall be the exclusive remedy against
the employer and "those conducting his business" or against
"every officer, manager, agent, representative, or employee" of
the employer,3 or else specifically grant common law rights
* A.B. Harvard Univ.; Insurance adjuster, Travelers Insurance Company;
Second-year student, Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 68.00, 67.00 (1957 Cum. Supp.);
1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text § 90 (1959 Cum. Supp.).
2 2 Larson § 71.00, 71.30.
3 Hawaii Rev. L. § 97-11 (1955); I1. Rev. St. c. 48 § 138.5 (b) (1953); N. M.
Stat. Ann. § 59-10-67 (1957 Supp.); N. C. Code § 97-9 (1958); S. C. Code§ 72.401 (1952); Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 8306 § 3 (Vernon 1948); Va. Code § 65.99
(1950); W. Va. Code § 2516 (1) (1956).
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against "any person not in the same employ." 4 The compensa-
tion statutes of the remaining thirty-three states grant common
law rights against "third persons," or "persons other than the
employer." 5 Ohio may be considered with this group although
the Ohio statute actually makes no mention of any rights against
third parties. The third party action in Ohio is entirely a matter
of judicial construction. The question of whether a fellow em-
ployee is a "third person" amenable to suit has not been decided
in all of the states in the last mentioned group. Fourteen of these
states appear to have no reported cases on point.6 However, out
of the remaining nineteen, only four states have interpreted their
workmen's compensation acts to grant immunity to fellow em-
ployees.7 In the remaining fifteen, it is well settled that the com-
pensation acts do not bar common law negligence actions against
co-employees.8 This ratio-four denying the action to fifteen al-
4 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1022 (1956); Colo. Rev. St. § 81-13-8 (1953);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19 § 2363 (1957 Cum. Supp.); Mich. Comp. Laws § 413.15
(1956 Supp.); N. Y. Work. Comp. Law § 29, subd. 1, 6 (1957 Cum. Supp.);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85 § 44 (1952); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 656.154 (1953); Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1953); Wash. Rev. Code § 51.24.010 (1957).
5 Ala. Code tit. 26, § 312 (1955 Cum. Supp.); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 43-3-30 (1949); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1340 (1947); Calif. Lab. Code § 3852
(West 1955); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-156 (1958); Fla. Stat. § 440.39 (1957); Ga.
Code Ann. § 114-403 (1956); Idaho Code Ann. § 72-204 (1957); Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 40-1213 (Burns 1957 Supp.); Iowa Code § 85.22 (1954); Kans. Gen.
Stat. § 44-504 (1957 Cum. Supp.); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.055 (1953); La. Rev.
Stat. tit. 23 § 1101 (1950); Me. Rev. Stat. c. 31, § 25 (1954); Md. Code Ann.
art. 101, § 58 (1951); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 152, § 15 (1953); Minn. Stat.
§ 176.061, subd. 1, 5 (1957); Miss. Code Ann. § 6998-36 (1952); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 287.150 (1949); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 92-204 (1947); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 48-118 (1952); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616, 560 (1957); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 281:14 (1955); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-40 (1957 Supp.); N. D. Rev. Code
§ 65-0109 (1943); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, § 671 (1956 Supp.); R. I. Gen. Laws
§ 28-35-58 (1956); S. D. Code § 64.0301 (1939); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-914
(1956); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 624 (1959); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 102.29 (1957);
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 72-109 (1957 Supp.).
6 Ala., Alaska, Ind., Iowa, Kan., Me., Miss., Mont., Nev., N. D., R. I.,
S. D., Vt., Wyo.
7 Idaho: White v. Ponozzo, 77 Idaho 276, 291 P. 2d 843 (1955); Mass.: Caira
v. Caira, 296 Mass. 448, 6 N. E. 2d 431 (1937); Tenn: Majors v. Moneymaker,
196 Tenn. 698, 270 S. W. 2d 328 (1954); Ky.: Mahan v. Litton, 321 S. W. 2d
243 (1959). However, the last cited case is a weak one. In the opinion the
court says, "We regret the appellee's confidence in the strength of his case
is such that he has declined to file a brief. This conclusion is not so
obvious to us." Actually, the question of the defendant fellow servant
qualifying as a third party is considered nowhere in the opinion.
8 Ark.: King v. Cardin, 319 S. W. 2d 214 (1959); Calif.: Singleton v. Bon-
nesen, 280 P. 2d 481 (1955); Conn.: Wells v. Lavitt, 115 Conn. 117, 160 Atl.
617 (1932); Fla.: Frantz v. McBee Co., 77 So. 2d 796 (1955); Ga.: Gay v.
Greene, 91 Ga. App. 78, 84 S. E. 2d 847 (1954); La.: Kimbro v. Holladay,
154 So. 369 (1934); Md.: Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Sara Hutter, Superior
court of Baltimore City, Daily Record, March 13, 1943; Minn.: Monson v.
Arcand, 58 N. W. 2d 753 (1953); Mo.: Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo.
App. 543, 38 S. W. 2d 497 (1931); Neb.: Rehn v. Bringaman, 151 Neb. 196,
36 N. W. 2d 856 (1949); N. H.: Merchant's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Tuttle, 98
(Continued on next page)
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lowing it-indicates that eventually a sound majority of those
states which have not specifically barred the action by statute
will allow co-employees to be treated as third parties in industrial
negligence cases.
The correctness of the decisions of the various courts in al-
lowing or not allowing tort immunity for fellow servants has
been argued at length elsewhere.9 Generally speaking it involves
nothing more than the ordinary rules of statutory interpreta-
tion. If any of the interpretations already on the books are to be
changed, it will probably be through change in the statutes them-
selves. 10
Bearing in mind the common law doctrine of the "vice-prin-
cipal," one might consider certain employees in supervisory cate-
gories to be the alter ego of the employer and therefore share
the employer's immunity from suit. Apparently the only court
which has seriously approached this idea is the Supreme Court
of Ohio. In a 1927 case involving an employee injured by his fore-
man's negligent operation of industrial machinery, the Ohio court
held the foreman to be immune from suit.1 ' But the reasoning
of the court indicates that the defendant's supervisory capacity
was not the deciding factor, but rather the court's construction
of the compensation statute as an exclusive remedy. In 1936, in
Morrow v. Hume,'2 a similar situation came before the Ohio
Court when a salesman was injured while in a car negligently
driven by his company's vice-president in charge of sales. Here,
however, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover, and dis-
tinguished its earlier ruling on the unusual bases that a foreman
operating machinery was the alter ego of the employer, but that
a vice-president driving his own car was not. Although the auto
trip was admitted to be clearly within the course and scope of
the employment of both parties, the court stated that no facts
had been alleged to show the employer had any power or right
to direct the operation and control of the automobile.
In Ellis v. Garwood,13 in 1957, the Ohio court held that be-
(Continued from preceding page)
N. H. 349, 101 A. 2d 262 (1953); N. J.: Churchill v. Stephens, 91 N. J. Law
195, 102 Atl. 657 (1917); Ohio.: Gee v. Horvath, 157 N. E. 2d 354 (1959); Pa.:
Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529, 146 Ati. 130, (1929); Wis.: McGonigle v.
Grippham, 201 Wis. 269, 229 N. W. 81, (1930).
9 Case note, Workmen's Compensation-Liability of Fellow Servant as a
Third Party for Negligence, 23 Tenn. L. R., 1084, (1955).
10 At least three states have made changes in their statutes to make co-
employees immune from suit. Botthof v. Fenske, 280 Ill. App. 362 (1935)
(decided before the amendment of 1953); Sergeant v. Kennedy, 352 Mich.
494, 90 N. W. 2d 447 (1958); Crawford v. Parsons, 141 W. Va. 752, 92 S. E.
2d 913 (1956).
11 Landrum v. Middaugh, 117 Ohio St. 608, 160 N. E. 691 (1927). See also
Rosenberger v. L'Archer, 31 N. E. 2d 700 (1936).
12 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N. E. 2d 39 (1936).
13 168 Ohio St. 241; 143 N. E. 2d 715 (1957).
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cause of the distinction made in Morrow v. Hume, ordinary fel-
low-employees were not immune from suit in automobile acci-
dents within the course and scope of their employment. Two
years later, in Gee v. Horvath,14 a case involving negligent in-
jury of an employee by a fellow employee using industrial ma-
chinery, the court dropped the attempted distinction between
automobiles and machinery and clearly stated that an employee
under workmen's compensation was not precluded from main-
taining an action against a fellow employee. Although this case
involves an employee v. employee relation rather than an em-
ployee v. foreman relation, it makes fairly clear the court's in-
tention to do away with any alter ego immunity for supervisors
in the future.
In the other fourteen states, no distinction appears to have
been made on the basis of supervisory employee sharing his em-
ployer's tort immunity. Common law actions have been allowed
against foremen, 15 supervisors, 6 general managers, 7 and cor-
porate officers.' 8 In Minnesota, a partnership is recognized as an
entity, so that the partnership is immune from suit; but the in-
dividual partners may be sued as third persons under the com-
pensation act. 19 This last distinction has been rejected else-
where, however, and generally the courts recognize a partner-
ship as being no different from its individual members, and
grant immunity to both.20
In an individually owned business, clearly the owner is the
employer and immune as such. Similarly, a trustee who runs a
business for a proprietary owner is held to replace the owner
and fall heir to his immunity and is not a mere agent of the
owner.
2 1
Company physicians who treat employees are also third
parties amenable to suit. One New Jersey court holds that a
company doctor may not be sued for aggravation of an injury for
14 Supra note 8.
15 Churchill v. Stephens, supra note 8.
16 Wells v. Lavitt, supra note 8; Wolford v. Chambersburg Oil & Gas Co.
86 D & C 496, 3 Lebanon 342 (1952).
17 Kimbro v. Holladay, supra note 8; Echols v. Chattanooga Mercantile
Co., 74 Ga. App. 18, 38 S. E. 2d 675 (1946). (This case involves a willful
assault, but the reasoning indicates the outcome would be the same for
mere negligence.)
Is Morrow v. Hume, supra note 12; Borochoff v. Fowler, 98 Ga. App. 411,
105 S. E. 2d 764 (1958); Adams v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 107 So.
2d 496 (1958); Leidy v. Taliaferro, 260 S. W. 2d 504 Mo. (1953); Webster
v. Stewart, 210 Mich. 13, 177 N. W. 230 (1920) (Decided before the Michigan
statute was changed.)
19 Gleason v. Sing, 210 Minn. 253, 297 N. W. 720 (1941); Monson v. Arcand,
supra note 8.
20 Reed v. Industrial Accident Commission, 10 Cal. 2d 191, 73 P. 2d 1212
(1937); Parker v. Zanglhi, 45 N. J. Supp. 167, 131 A. 2d 802 (1957); Greenya
v. Gordon, 389 Pa. 499, 133 A. 2d 595 (1957).
21 Wolford v. Chambersburg Oil & Gas Co., supra note 16.
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which compensation has been paid on the grounds that there is
no new injury.22 This would appear to be contrary to the usually
accepted law on malpractice, and the decision has been criticized
in another New Jersey appellate court.2 3 Elsewhere, medical
malpractice is recognized as giving the employee a cause of action
whether the original injury was compensable or not.24
Ordinarily, if an injured employee attempts to sue an execu-
tive in tort he must show that the defendant was a direct par-
ticipant in the wrong alleged.25 However, this is not always so.
There are some jurisdictions which accept the Restatement of
Agency rule that a servant may in a single act be the servant of
two masters at the same time.20 An application of this rule can
yield interesting results. Leidy v. Taliaferro27 involved a com-
pany president who had sent two employees in a company truck
to pick up some of his personal property. This was acknowl-
edged to be within his authority as corporation president, and the
trip was within the course and scope of the employees' employ-
ment with the corporation. During the trip, one of the two men
was injured as a result of the other's negligent driving. Stating
the rule that a servant may serve two masters in a single act,
the court held that even though the injury was compensable as
employment connected, the injured party could maintain an ac-
tion against the company president on the basis of vicarious li-
ability. The negligent driver was the servant of both the cor-
poration and its president as an individual at the same time.
In some jurisdictions, the liability imposed by statute on
owners of motor vehicles may be used to reach a co-employee
executive who was not an actual participant in the negligent act.28
This has been allowed even in a state where the co-employee
driver was himself statutorily immune from suit.29
Where they exist, statutory provisions for subrogation 30 or
election of remedies3 1 may have the same limiting effect on the
value of co-employee third party actions which they have on
any third party action. However, the present trend indicates that
co-employee third party actions may be allowed in a majority of
the fifty states in the near future, and as the value of a workmen's
compensation award depreciates yearly and the collectibility of
the co-employee improves, such actions can hardly avoid becom-
ing more and more attractive.
22 Burns v. Vilardo, 60 A. 2d, 94 N. J. L. (1948).
23 Dettmar v. Goldsmith, 11 N. J. Super. 571, 78 A. 2d 626 (1951).
24 Gay v. Greene, supra note 8.
25 Adams v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., supra note 18.
20 Restatement, Second, Agency § 226, 236.
27 Supra note 18.
28 Gleason v. Sing, supra note 19.
29 Naso v. Lafata, 170 N. Y. S. 2d 905 (1958).
30 2 Larson § 74.
31 2 Larson § 73.
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